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The exportability of Singapore’s industrial 
development model to other Asian environments has, 
together with its traditional state-led, market-driven 
intervention, been a hallmark of the city-state’s 
regionalization program. The paper presents an empirical 
analysis on the portability of this transborder 
industrialization strategy, and contributes new insights to 
the discourse on state-enterprise networks promulgating 
transnational entrepreneurial ventures. Empirical 
evidence from on-site surveys/interviews in Indonesia, 
China, Vietnam and India will be presented. Our study 
concludes that, while efforts have been remarkable, this 
attempt at re-engineering economic space has not fully 
accounted for the intricacies of economic and socio-
political realities in host environments. 
 
Often perceived as an archetypal interventionist state, 
Singapore’s strategy to remain economically competitive 
in the global economy can be interpreted as the building 
of platforms for national growth though the management 
of strategic alliances and cooperation. Through selective 
interventions, the island-state attempts to reallocate key 
economic resources via the ‘developmental state model’; 
whereby economic restructuring, industrial transformation 
and rapid economic growth are achieved through 
‘collaborations’ with private or semi-private enterprises 
on national economic projects.  
The Singapore government’s strategic intentions 
were translated into concrete policies and programs, and 
encapsulated in the policy document, Singapore 
Unlimited (Singapore Economic Development Board 
(SEDB), 1995a). Singapore Unlimited can be 
conceptualized as a deliberate effort by strategic actors in 
the city-state to extend their influence and relations, 
amidst the limitations of a resource-constrained domestic 
environment. Regionalization 21 (R21), a strategic 
component of Singapore Unlimited, positioned the 
government’s strategic intent to create an external 
economy, by participating in the dynamic growth 
opportunities of Asia-Pacific economies. Through the 
R21 initiatives, Singapore’s role in the global economy 
expands from being an attractive location for investment 
inflows to becoming an origin of these flows to 
participate in the regional (and global) economy. 
The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows. 
Further background on the impetus behind R21 is 
presented, in the next section, to highlight the Singapore 
government’s strong interventionist style, extended to the 
regionalization policy. The origins and progress of the 
industrial-township projects in Indonesia, China, Vietnam 
and India are briefly described in section three. Empirical 
evidence drawn from our on-site surveys and interviews 
will be discussed in section four. Finally, implications 
garnered from these experiences, as they relate to the 
government’s role in Singapore’s regionalization 
program, will be presented in the concluding section. 
 
Singapore’s Regionalization Stratagem 
 
The Singapore government’s initial intention in its 
regional investments in Indonesia, Vietnam, China, and 
India was to play a dominant role as a stakeholder, a 
facilitator and a partner to domestic enterprises seeking 
investments abroad (SEDB, 1995a); that it has, indeed, 
succeeded in the latter two is evident from the creation of 
familiar Singapore-havens in the form of the industrial 
parks, and in the restructuring of taxation policies. The 
state also embarks on fostering trusted regional networks 
identical to those within its domestic market, whereby 
interlocking interests, the intimate sharing of ideas and 
commonality of values, crystallize a macroscopic system 
of cooperative competition (Yeoh et al., 2004a). This is 
especially relevant for Singapore, which, by reason of its 
small size, operates through interlocking directorships in 
government-linked companies; this has facilitated the 
implementation of strategic initiatives, at a national level, 
with minimal conflict of interests. 
The dominance it envisioned in the role of 
stakeholder, however, has been shown to be highly 
conditional, reliant to a great degree on the realities of the 
host environment. Implicit in the regionalization strategy 
was the Singapore government’s intention to draw on its 
effective state enterprise network (or, in local parlance, 
Singapore Inc), and extend this network to facilitate 
business ventures in the region; it was felt that, given 
ostensibly analogous cultures, understanding through 
racial networks, and relatively strong governmental 
directions, such an extra-territorial network had potential 
for success. Theoretically, the `vested interests’ within the 
interlinked collaborative system would serve to expedite 
processes, garner exclusive incentives, and negate inept 
bureaucracy; some of which was sometimes the case, as 
in BIP, and some of which proved to be emphatically not, 
at least not in its initial form, as in CS-SIP. 
 
Singapore’s Overseas Industrial Parks 
The regional industrial parks program was a critical 
component of R21, premised on the combined attraction 
of Singapore-styled management, and location-specific 
advantages present in said economies; all of this while, as 
envisioned by transborder industrialization strategies, 
generating additional economic space for Singapore-
based companies, both indigenous and foreign, to 
redistribute resource-dependent operations to lower-cost 
production sites, while upgrading their Singapore-
operations to higher-end activities which require the city-
state’s unique set of competencies (SEDB, 1995a; Perry 
and Yeoh, 2000) 
Batamindo Industrial Park (BIP) The prototype for 
Singapore’s overseas industrial-parks program, 
Batamindo Industrial Park (BIP) is located on the Riau 
island of Batam. BIP was launched in 1992. Designed to 
be a self-sufficient, self-contained environment with 
communication and business linkages running through 
Singapore, thus bypassing Indonesia’s bureaucracy, BIP’s 
prototype structure includes internally-managed power 
generators, a water treatment plant and sewerage system, 
telecommunications facilities, and commercial centres. 
BIP has its own shipping and warehouse provider, 
offering freight transportation to and from Singapore. The 
strategic intent was to create a manufacturing enclave that 
mirrors conditions in Singapore, providing the premium 
‘Singapore’ development standards in a low income 
economy. Labor is mainly recruited from Java and 
Sumatra.  
BIP’s first tenants were mainly subsidiaries of 
American, European, and Japanese multinationals already 
operating in Singapore. Cumulative investments and 
export value in BIP topped US$1billion and US$2 billion 
in 2004 respectively, and the number of confirmed tenants 
increased from 17 in 1991 to 85 in 2004. Of these, 39 
were Japanese companies with Singapore-owned 
companies the next largest concentration at 25. American 
and European investors accounts for less than 20 percent 
of the total client base. There is a concentration of 
electronics operations, mainly various component 
assembly processes, and supporting activities to the 
electronics sector such as plastic molding and packaging. 
Out of total employment of 65,000, over 85% are female, 
most aged from 18-22. 
China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park (CS-SIP) 
The physical design of the first industrial township in 
Suzhou was identical to that of the BIP-prototype; the 
strategic context in which they were developed, however, 
were, in many ways, diametric opposites. Singapore’s 
primary concern with the Indonesian investments had 
been to promote the restructuring of the Singapore 
economy, and exploit the resource complementarities of 
contiguous economies (Ho, 1994); too, the Indonesian 
experience had been vastly simplified by endorsements 
from senior politicians, which guaranteed a degree of 
administrative certainty, strengthened by the political 
patronage of the main commercial partner. China, in 
contrast, proved a dizzyingly complex administrative and 
regulatory environment; the projects had to contend with 
multiple tiers of government administration, as well as the 
competition (or more precisely, the `fiscal politics’) 
between these tiers at a time of rapid economic and 
political change. In terms of agenda, too, the Suzhou 
project proved a different kind of beast; rather than 
seeking to exploit economic advantages, the China 
investment sought, instead, to showcase the Singapore 
development model and – more importantly – its 
transferability to other Asian environments. 
CS-SIP was Singapore's most ambitious, and 
controversial, overseas township project. Initially 
estimated to cost US$20 billion, the 70 km2 project was 
conceived as a balanced community with a full range of 
urban facilities for its projected population of 360,000. 
CS-SIP was slated to be the new commercial centre of 
Suzhou and the surrounding areas. The Singapore model, 
as applied to CS-SIP, envisaged a large-scale project to 
facilitate institutional innovation, with autonomy from 
aspects of local government control and investment in 
administrative practices or ‘software development’ 
(SIPAC, 1999). This project encompassed high-quality 
infrastructure, pollution control, ‘one-stop’ and 
corruption-free operating and decision-making processes, 
minimal entry /performance regulations, transparent 
financial charges, and the delivery of social and welfare 
services to support an efficient and co-operative 
workforce and a work-oriented community. CS-SIP was 
officially launched on May 12, 1994.  
Business-wise, the project was a joint venture 
between a consortium of Chinese and Singapore-based 
investors; the Chinese consortia’s 35 percent stake was 
shared amongst 12 organizations, mainly national state-
owned enterprises and investment companies of the 
Suzhou city and Jiangsu province, while the Singapore 
consortium’s 65 percent stake was distributed amongst 24 
organizations, mainly Singapore GLCs, and the Salim 
Group’ subsidiary, KMP China Investments. The two 
consortia retained separate identities and responsibilities, 
taking up projects according to their agreed roles (SIPAC, 
1999). 
The synergy that was envisioned at the onset of the 
project was, however, not to materialize (Pereira, 2004). 
The slow progress resulted in financial losses for the 
Singapore-led consortium, which funded the land 
development and infrastructure, and also for Singaporean 
investors involved in peripheral projects. Official 
estimates placed Singapore’s investment in CS-SIP at 
only US$147 million. In June 1999, it was announced that 
Singapore would reduce its involvement in the project and 
transfer majority ownership of CSSD to the Chinese 
consortium in 2001.  
Significantly, investments began to pour in almost 
immediately afterwards; by June 2001, 193 investment 
projects worth over US$5.1 billion were recorded. To-
date, CS-SIP has attracted over 1300 foreign companies 
and 6500 domestic companies, accounting for a 
cumulative contractual foreign investment of US$15 
billion, and cumulative contractual domestic investment 
of RMB 30 billion. Its tenant-profile includes a significant 
proportion of American and European investors 
(including 50 Fortune 500 companies), with some 73 
percent of the investments directed into electronics, 
information technology and other high-tech segments. 
The third phase of CS-SIP’s International Science Park 
was launched in April 2003, and is scheduled to be 
completed in June 2005. 
Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park (VSIP) VSIP is 
Singapore’s flagship investment in Vietnam. Launched in 
1996, the 500-hectare park is strategically located in Binh 
Duong Province, 17 km north of Ho Chi Minh City, and 
is within a 40-minute drive from the international airport 
and seaports. A self-contained, self-sufficient industrial 
park with prepared land plots, and ready-built factories, 
bolstered by Singapore-style management expertise and 
infrastructure support, VSIP offers investors ‘hassle-free’ 
one-stop service, ready-built factories, and Singapore-
styled management expertise and infrastructure support. 
A 300,000-strong working population within a 15-km 
radius from VSIP provides a ready pool of low-cost, 
skilled labor. 
In VSIP, Singapore applied lessons learned from its 
China experience, and made deliberate efforts to foster 
strong collaboration with local authorities. A management 
board was set up, chaired by the Vice Chairman of the 
Binh Duong Province People's Committee, which pre-
empted the perception that VSIP was a partnership forced 
upon by the central government. The Board, with 
representatives from the Ministries of Trade, Finance and 
Interior, as well as the General Customs Department, 
oversees the issue of investment licenses, import/export 
permits, and construction permits. VSIP is jointly 
developed by a Singapore consortium led by SembCorp 
Industries and Becamex, a Vietnamese state-owned 
enterprise in Binh Duong Province. 
SEDB’s role in promoting VSIP is evident. The 
difficult environment post-1997 notwithstanding, 
cumulative investment commitments in VSIP exceeded 
US$400 million within the first 5 years from its launch. 
However, unlike BIP, where the focus on electronics and 
other light industries complements the restructuring of 
Singapore’s manufacturing sector, VSIP is less selective 
in its tenant profile; the tenant-mix reflects the 
overwhelming importance of Asian MNEs (85%), while 
the sector mix ranges from textiles, to electronics and 
pharmaceuticals. Singaporean and non-Asian companies 
are represented in a mix of industries, while the Japanese 
companies are largely concentrated in electronics. VSIP’s 
major tenants include Konica, Nitto Denko, Kimberly-
Clark, Diethelm and Roche. 
VSIP is already in phase 3 of development. 
Investment commitments are currently valued in excess of 
US$840 million, in a broad swathe of industries - food, 
electrical and electronics, pharmaceuticals and healthcare, 
specialty materials, consumer goods and light industries. 
VSIP has 138 committed tenants from 21 countries, of 
which 80 are already operational. 33,000 jobs have been 
created, with the number expected to rise to 40,000 when 
the remaining tenants commence operations. VSIP posted 
its first profits in 2002. 
International Technology Park Limited (ITPL) 
ITPL, located 18 km away from Bangalore in India’s 
Silicon Valley, was positioned as a forerunner for a new 
generation of Singapore-developed IT parks in India. 
Construction commenced in September 1994, and the 
park was officially inaugurated in 2000. The partners in 
this project are a Singapore consortium led by Ascendas 
International, India’s Tata Group and the Karnataka state 
government in a 40-40-20 arrangement. The state 
government has since reduced its stake to 6 percent, while 
the Singapore consortium and the Tata Group have 
increased their respective stakes to 47 percent each. 
From the outset, ITPL was to be an existence quite 
distinct from its sister parks, with a primarily IT and high-
tech industry focus; it was, however, marketed much the 
same as the other industrial parks, as an environment that 
“cuts through the red tape and bottlenecks that are a part 
of India’s infrastructure and operating environment”. 
ITPL’s futuristic design comes complete with amenities 
and support services, and includes residential apartments 
and penthouses. More distinctively, ITPL guarantees 
uninterrupted power supply and telecommunication 
facilities, immediate-occupancy business incubator space, 
and the formulaic `one-stop’ service; features designed to 
boost the park’s attractiveness to potential tenants in the 
targeted IT and high-tech industries. 
The first 39 tenants of ITPL began operations in 
1999, creating some 2,000 jobs. Today, ITPL is already in 
Phase 1C of development, and houses 106 companies 
employing around 12,000 people. More than half these 
tenants are represented by wholly foreign–owned firms, 
including several major global players, among them AOL 
Member Services, IBM Global Services, and Infineon 
Technologies. More than 70 percent of tenants are 
involved in software development, integrated circuit 
design, research and development and precision 
technology. ITPL, it seems, is now quite firmly ensconced 
in the IT scene. 
 Reflections It is a fact that many special privileges 
were secured by Singapore’s flagship projects; many of 
them unprecedented, and unique, to the Parks. For 
instance, all the Parks were allowed to build and operate 
their own power and water treatment plants, and 
telecommunication facilities, which in Indonesia and 
Vietnam, was an exclusive concession granted to the 
Singapore partners. As a result, the Parks enjoy the 
reputation of possessing reliable infrastructural facilities 
in areas where such facilities are, to say the least, not the 
norm. As well, the management boards of the parks 
typically include local government officials, an 
arrangement which facilitates the parks’ privileged access 
to investment approvals, construction activities, 
import/export permits and immigration matters. The net 
result of all of this being that the self-sufficient, self-
contained environment of the Parks presents investors 
with the formulaic and well-advertised one-stop service 
which filters out many of the administrative uncertainties 
associated with emerging economies, and is able to 
capitalize on (and further expand) Singapore’s positive 
reputation with multinational corporations for its stable, 
corrupt-free investment environment. This association 
lends credibility to both the parks and their tenants; ITPL, 
for one, is being used by many tenants to establish a 
positive, almost Singapore-styled, brand image. 
Nonetheless, as openly admitted by the Singapore 
government, neither the strategically-engineered inter-
government endorsement of the flagship projects, nor the 
enormous resources mobilized through the strategic 
partnerships, have proven able to shield the parks from a 
gamut of problems, running from issues pertaining to 
BIP’s resemblance to a Japanese investment enclave and 
vulnerability to a withdrawal of Japanese investments, the 
limited impact of the Indonesia parks on the transfer of 
low-value operations from Singapore and the associated 
upgrading of linked activities in Singapore (Yeoh, et al. 
2004b), to the above-noted and extensively documented 
‘Suzhou-Wuxi’ experience. Our studies point to the 
possibility of similar problems plaguing or beginning to 
plague the lesser-known parks in Vietnam and India. 
 
Empirical Findings 
 
All four case-study Parks have been in operation for 
at least seven years, and have catalyzed the development 
of similar industrial parks in their vicinity. To ascertain 
the situation on the ground, we applied the questionnaire 
developed in Yeoh, Perry and Lim (2000) to the tenants in 
these four regional industrial parks to assess the 
differential impact of various pull factors on the tenant-
firms’ investment decisions, along with the differential 
impact of different constraints on their current operations. 
Designed as a comparative study to investigate the 
various factors influencing firms' investment decisions, 
the survey was conducted in the respective countries from 
December 2002 to August 2004. A total of 160 responses 
were collected from tenant-firms: of these, 25 were 
located in BIP, 47 were located in VSIP, 33 in ITPL, and 
the remaining 53 in CS-SIP. The surveys were conducted 
through face-to-face interviews in the case-study parks. 
Apart from analyzing the descriptive statistics and 
popular rankings on the responses relating to factors and 
constraints, a logit analysis was applied to compare the 
abovementioned constraints and push/pull factors. 
 
Factors Influencing the Respondents’ 
Decision to Locate in the Parks  
Singapore leverages on its infrastructure-
development expertise and the low-cost labor available in 
the host environments to market its industrial parks. It 
supplements these purported advantages with its political 
commitment to the Parks, as demonstrated by the plethora 
of bilateral agreements between Singapore’s GLCs and 
host governments and politically-linked business 
conglomerates. Surprisingly (or not), though, ‘political 
commitment from the Singapore government’ was not 
frequently cited by tenants from any parks other than BIP 
(68%); with 13%, 18% and 13% for VSIP, ITPL and CS-
SIP respectively; likely due to continuing concerns over 
the instability of Indonesia’s political environment. This 
was also indicated by the positive and statistically 
significant α 1 (= 3.002), which shows that firms choosing 
‘political commitment from the Singapore government’ as 
a pull factor for them to locate in the specific park were 
more likely to be from BIP, as well as by historical 
evidence; the post-Soeharto era  saw many firms pulling 
out of BIP in response to growing political unrest, and the 
post 9-11 era saw inflow of new investment commitments 
into BIP trickling to a halt. The situation has been further 
exacerbated by the frequent changes in political 
leadership, with five presidents in the past six years; and 
frequent reshuffling of key economic positions. All these 
have served to complicate investors’ assessment of 
Indonesia’s political outlook, making it imperative for the 
Singapore authorities to signal its political commitment to 
the progress of the Park. It is somewhat surprising, then, 
that political commitment from the host government, 
while not statistically significant compared to the other 
factors cited by respondents from BIP, was nonetheless 
cited by 84% of respondents. The fact that political 
commitment from the Singapore government was not a 
concern for the VSIP, ITPL and CS-SIP firms, perhaps, is 
more surprising and significant; it would seem to signal 
either that the additional ‘political’ capital Singapore has 
to offer is of limited significance to the tenant-firms in 
these Singapore-styled projects. 
 ‘Political commitment from the host country 
government’ was frequently cited by the respondents 
from VSIP and CS-SIP, making it the top-ranked strength 
for both parks, with the positive and statistical α2 (=1.237) 
indicating that firms choosing this as a pull factor were 
more likely to locate in these parks. This is, most 
probably, a reflection of the respondents’ concerns over 
the degree of control and impact on the political-
economic environment held by host governments. For 
CS-SIP, this also goes a long way towards explaining the 
turnaround in the park’s performance after it was handed 
over to the Chinese partner, given the corresponding 
increase in the level of political commitment from China. 
Interestingly enough, the implication that this factor is not 
likely to be chosen by firms from ITPL, further verified 
by the highly negative and statistically significant α2 (=-
3.224), might signify a perception of lack of sufficient 
political support from the host government, or a lack of 
concern as to the influence of the host government of the 
Park’s operations. 
Besides the above, political commitment from host-
country government, competitive labor costs or presence 
of major suppliers were also relatively less important to 
firms in ITPL, as indicated by the negative and 
statistically significant α2 (= -3.224), α4 (= -2.171) and α7 
(= -2.739); firms in ITPL, instead, focus mainly on the 
availability of skilled and educated labour, indicated by 
both the statistical results (positive and statistically 
significant at α3 (= 1.362), and the popular results (cited 
by 48% of the respondents from ITPL), making it the top-
ranked strength considered to the Park’s tenants. The 
high-tech and IT focus of ITPL, arguably, accounts 
partially for this almost-exclusive focus; the location and 
internal market advantages afforded by the highly-
educated and well-trained engineers produced by 
universities in India are unmistakably the critical factor 
for ITPL. 
Respondents in BIP, on the other hand, cited most 
frequently ‘competitive labor costs’ as a pull factor, with 
88% of the tenants indicating so, and as indicated by the 
positive and statistically significant α4 (=1.800). This is 
not unexpected considering that BIP serves as a low-cost 
investment enclave, and a large proportion of the tenants 
in BIP engage in labor-intensive manufacturing activities. 
Similarly, competitive labor costs proved to be a deciding 
factor for firms locating in VSIP, as indicated by the 
positive and highly significant α4 (= 2.415). Most 
contrarily, however, none of the CS-SIP respondents even 
mentioned this factor! The ‘cheap and plentiful labor’, 
frequently stated to be the bane of labor-intensive 
manufacturing firms elsewhere, was most definitely not in 
evidence here. Much the opposite, in fact; anecdotal 
evidence from our on-site interviews pointed to a tight 
labor market in Suzhou, which was further proven by the 
negative and statistically significant α4 (=-1.187) for the 
pull factor ‘availability of skilled/educated labor’ for CS-
SIP; CS-SIP companies, it seems, have had to pay a 
premium for workers with the requisite skills, far from the 
minimum wage some sectors of the world associate with 
China. In a similar but opposite vein, the costs of doing 
business in Indonesia would seem to be not quite as high 
as some would expect, at least in BIP, as indicated by 
88% of the BIP respondents highlighting ‘competitive 
overhead costs’ as a pull factor, and a positive and 
statistically significant α5 (= 3.249). These results, 
however, differentiated the BIP respondents quite 
markedly from those in the other three parks; 
significantly, none of the respondents in ITPL cited 
‘competitive overhead costs’ as a pull factor, and in terms 
of popular rankings, this factor ranked fifth in both VSIP 
and CS-SIP. 
Concerning other factors, the presence of major 
suppliers was a major consideration of CS-SIP tenants, as 
Table 1: Factors Influencing Decision to Invest 
(Logit) 
Variables BIP VSIP ITPL SIP 
Political 
commitment 
(S’pore) (α1) 
3.002 -0.895 -0.767 -0.224 
P1 (0.004)~ (0.132) (0.281) (0.729) 
Political 
commitment 
(host c’try) 
(α2) 
0.604 1.237 -3.224 0.764 
P2 (0.538) (0.012)+ (0.0001)~ (0.139) 
Availability of 
skilled/educat
ed labor (α3) 
2.354 -0.773 1.362 -1.187 
P3 (0.014)+ (0.100) (0.023)+ (0.025)+ 
Competitive 
labor costs 
(α4) 
1.800 2.415 -2.171 -21.545 
P4 (0.072)* (0.0001)~ (0.068)* (0.997) 
Competitive 
overheads 
(α5) 
3.249 -1.538 -19.475 0.715 
P5 (0.001)~ (0.062)* (0.997) (0.375) 
Presence of 
major buyers 
(α6) 
0.806 0.756 0.896 -4.655 
P6 (0.579) (0.200) (0.200) (0.004)~ 
Presence of 
major 
suppliers (α7) 
0.058 -2.267 -2.739 3.572 
P7 (0.968) (0.001)~ (0.004)~ (0.001)~ 
Constant (α0) -6.929 -1.342 0.451 -0.550 
P0 (0.0001)~ (0.003)~ (0.373) (0.270) 
~ Significant at 1% level 
+ Significant at 5% level 
                                * Significant at 10% level 
indicated by the positive and statistically significant α7 (= 
3.572), and in sharp contrast to the negative and 
statistically significant α7 (= -2.267) and α7 (= -2.739) for 
VSIP and ITPL respectively. This result can be explained, 
in part, by the tenant profile in CS-SIP. Of the 53 SIP 
tenants interviewed, only 8 were wholly China-owned 
corporations; the remaining firms were majority-owned 
by foreign owners, from Singapore and elsewhere. It is 
plausible that the foreign firms situate in CS-SIP for the 
availability of ‘cheap’ raw materials; as such, the 
presence of major suppliers is essential to their operations 
and the building of their value chains. In contrast, a 
negative, significant α6 (=-6.452) suggests that the 
presence of major buyers within the Park was not critical 
to operations. This again can be explained partly by the 
tenant profile, as many foreign firms re-export 
manufactured products to their domestic markets instead 
of selling in China itself. 
 
Major Constraints on Respondents’ 
Operations 
BIP, VSIP, ITPL and CS-SIP are now established 
industrial-estate developments, but our study alludes to 
some emerging constraints which have undermined the 
attractiveness of the Parks. These constraints can be 
categorized into three broad groups, namely, those 
relating to labor, those relating to organization and 
technology, and those relating to the economic 
‘environment’ (e.g. issues relating to government policies 
and regulations). 
Labor-related Constraints Our results suggest that 
many of the purported labor advantages failed to 
materialize. The ‘cheap’ labor resources which drew 
companies to Indonesia, for instance, proved to be mere 
perception rather than reality in BIP; ‘rising labor costs’ 
was the main constraint stated by the majority (84%) of 
the BIP tenants. Moreover, a number of problems with 
industrial relations (as indicated by 68% of the 
respondents) exacerbated the difficulties faced by BIP’s 
tenants, which perform predominantly labor-intensive 
activities; this is further documented by lamentations of 
low labor productivity during our interviews with the 
tenants, an example of the multitude of hidden costs faced 
by tenants in BIP. 
Over in the other low-cost manufacturing enclave, 
though, many VSIP tenants, on the other hand, did not 
appear to be facing problems of rising labor costs, as 
indicated by the negative and significant β3 (= -1.979), or 
difficulties over low labour productivity, as suggested by 
the statistically significant β4 (= -0.856). Instead, many 
VSIP respondents (72%) cited shortage of professionals 
and managers as the critical bottleneck; another perhaps 
unexpected complication to the envisioned synergy of 
low-cost labor and low-skill requirements. ITPL 
respondents, on the other hand, frequently cited both 
‘shortage of professionals and managers’ and ‘rising labor 
costs’ as serious constraints, though the concern with 
‘shortage of professionals and managers’ was less serious 
as compared to the other three parks, indicated by the 
negative and statistically significant β2 (= -1.785). 
Significantly, though, none of the respondents cited ‘low 
labor productivity’ as a constraint of the part, indicating 
the high standard of the labor in ITPL; similarly, 
Table 2: Major Constraints on Operations (Logit) 
Variables BIP VSIP ITPL SIP 
Labor-related 
constraints     
Shortage of semi-
skilled and skilled 
labor(β
 1) 
1.192 0.868 -1.434 -0.838 
(p1) (0.063)* (0.040)+ (0.040)+ (0.065)* 
Shortage of 
professionals and 
managers(β
 2) 
-0.235 1.141 -1.785 0.708 
(p2) (0.729) (0.009)~ (0.001)~ (0.103) 
Rising labor costs 
(β3) 3.066 -1.979 -0.856 0.878 
(p3) (0.0001)~ (0.0001)~ (0.119) (0.038)+ 
Low labor 
productivity(β4) 1.431 -0.856 -20.576 1.826 
(p4) (0.045)+ (0.065)* (0.997) (0.0001)~ 
Industrial relation 
problems(β
 5) 3.426 0.409 -0.769 -3.397 
(p5) (0.0001)~ (0.486) (0.306) (0.002)~ 
Constant (β
 0) -5.126 -1.220 0.624 -1.361 
(p0) (0.0001)~ (0.001)~ (0.078)* (0.0001)~ 
Organizational 
constraints     
Difficulty in 
introducing new 
technology (β6) 
1.477 -0.345 -1.026 -0.022 
(p6) (0.005)! (0.455) (0.116) (0.960) 
Lack of good 
supporting services 
(β
 7) 
1.209 0.462 -1.232 -0.397 
(p
 7) (0.017)+ (0.232) (0.032)+ (0.320) 
High and/or rising 
overhead costs (β8) 2.092 -0.468 0.287 -0.712 
(p8) (0.001)~ (0.194) (0.480) (0.043)+ 
Constant (β
 0) -3.941 -0.719 -1.039 -0.258 
(p0) (0.0001)~ (0.006)~ (0.0001)~ (0.298) 
‘Environmental’ 
constraints     
Impact of host 
government 
regulations (β9) 
3.093 0.346 -0.722 -3.161 
(p9) (0.0001)~ (0.375) (0.145) (0.0001)~ 
Competition 
(overseas IPs) (β10) 0.719 0.152 -2.020 1.144 
(p10) (0.164) (0.697) (0.0001)~ (0.023)+ 
Competition 
(domestic IPs) (β11) -0.680 -1.364 -1.942 3.271 
(p11) (0.223) (0.004)~ (0.003)~ (0.0001)~ 
Constant (β
 0) -3.574 -0.817 0.024 -1.770 
(p0) (0.0001)~ (0.006)~ (0.936) (0.0001)~ 
~ Significant at 1% level 
+ Significant at 5% level 
                                * Significant at 10% level 
‘shortage of semi-skilled and skilled labor’ was not a 
concern by the tenants in 
ITPL, indicated by the negative and statistically 
significant β1 (= -1.434). This echoes our early findings 
about ‘availability of skilled and educated labour’ being 
considered a main strength by the firms in ITPL; one of 
the perceived synergies that did indeed materialize, and 
which doubtless serves to offset the shortage of 
professionals and rising labor costs. Finally, for CS-SIP 
tenants, ‘shortage of professionals and manages’ was the 
top main concern, followed by ‘low labor productivity’ 
and substantiated statistically by the positive and 
significant β4 (= 1.826) and β4 (= 1.431) respectively. 
Unlike BIP, ‘industrial relation problems’ was not a 
concern by tenants in CS-SIP, indicated by the negative 
and statistically significant β5 (= - 3.397). 
Organizational and Technological-related 
Constraints The Singapore-styled infrastructure, though 
reliable and efficient, also proved to be costly, as facilities 
such as the power plant, waste-treatment system and 
water supply are independently managed. This resulted in 
high overhead costs, especially in BIP where 80% of 
respondents cited it as a constraint they faced, and to 
some extent, in VSIP, ITPL and CS-SIP, where the 
corresponding percentages are 38%, 48% and 34%; 
making it the top-ranked organizational and 
technological-related constraint for all of the four parks. 
Significantly, ‘lack of good supporting services’ and 
‘difficulty in introducing new technology and techniques’ 
were highlighted as major operational constraints in all 
four parks. Comparatively, all of these constraints were 
more serious in BIP as compared to the other three parks, 
indicated by the positive and statistically significant β8 (= 
2.092), β7 (= 1.209) and β6 (= 1.477) respectively; 
pointing to these constraints being, in all probability, a 
fundamental and intrinsic quality of the Singapore-styled 
system, one even more obvious in the ‘prototype’ than in 
the succeeding parks. 
‘Environmental’ Constraints Government regulation 
was a significant constraint for tenants in BIP, VSIP and 
ITPL, evident from the fact that ‘impact of host 
government regulation’ has been most frequently cited by 
the respondents from all the three parks. Interestingly, this 
constraint seemed to be much less of a concern in CS-SIP, 
further verified by the negative and statistically 
significant β9 (= -3.161); it would seem that despite 
numerous incidents which would, to most minds, point to 
inefficient and corrupt bureaucracy in China, the present 
environment would seem rather more friendly than one 
would think. Conversely, though, ‘competition from 
domestic industrial parks’ was not a constraint to BIP, 
VSIP or ITPL, having been ranked last amount the 
environment constraints, using frequency and ranking; a 
surprising result at least in ITPL’s case, which is facing 
low-cost competition in its vicinity. However, it is the 
most serious constraint considered by tenants in CS-SIP, 
being the top-ranked ‘environmental’ constraint cited by 
75% of the respondents, and further indicated by the 
positive and statistically significant β11 (= 3.271). This is 
not too surprising as the transfer of majority ownership of 
CS-SIP from the Singapore government to the Chinese 
partners was in part due to the competition from the 
Suzhou New District (SND), managed by the provincial 
government in Suzhou. SND has been upgrading its hard 
and soft infrastructures, and mounting an aggressive 
investment promotion blitz in competition with CS-SIP. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In a relatively short period of time, the progress of 
Singapore’s overseas parks has been more than 
commendable. Not all of the purported advantages of the 
projects have materialized, however; the projects are far 
from perfect, and riddled with more than a few problems, 
not the least of which is a certain disconnect with the 
economic and policy environments they exist in. 
In Indonesia, BIP is now a well-established project, 
but it has not necessarily achieved all its development 
goals. It has been a springboard for Singapore-Indonesian 
co-operation in Riau, but it is not yet clear that Singapore 
has obtained the resource benefits looked for. BIP may be 
at risk from the breakdown of the township as a separate 
enclave, and the larger social tensions existing on Batam; 
and in the long term, the political uncertainties and policy 
nuances that radiate from Jakarta are unlikely to add to 
investor confidence. Additionally, the dual constraints of 
rising labor costs and problems with industrial relations 
are unlikely to have a minimal effect on the industrial 
park; altogether a clear case, perhaps, of the economic 
environment not quite matching what the planners had in 
mind. 
In China, CS-SIP has attracted a high level of foreign 
investment, fulfilling the intended niche of 
accommodating high-value projects from investors that 
are most at risk from administrative uncertainties, and 
lending credence to Singapore’s positive reputation with 
the multinationals. Its problems instead have stemmed 
from the lack of priority obtained from its local 
development partners, many of whom are involved in 
competing developments or are seeking to promote 
Suzhou as a whole, and not just CS-SIP. In retrospect, 
CS-SIP has experienced greater challenges as the `model’ 
was subjected to various, often incongruous, objectives 
thus setting the stage for conflicts of interest and the 
breeding of discontent, though this has been largely 
diffused following the handover to the Chinese partners. 
While all being said and done, tangible and intangible 
benefits have certainly been obtained, the Suzhou 
experience has clearly underlined the potential for trouble 
created by a disconnect with the policy environment.  
Over in Vietnam, however, Singapore’s investment 
in VSIP takes on the added political dimension of 
rendering development assistance to an ASEAN partner, 
overtly to foster greater bilateral ties. It is apparent from 
the mix of ‘targeted’ industries and the style of park 
management and operations that the intention is for the 
local partners to have a stronger sense of `ownership’ of 
the project. The focus on specific industries that 
complement Singapore’s economic restructuring is also 
absent, unlike in BIP. All the same, underlying vested 
interests to secure the city-state’s economic interests can 
be associated with this act of camaraderie; and 
notwithstanding the explicit or implicit objectives, intense 
market competition, and the inherent problems of 
corruption work in tandem to test this strategic initiative. 
While not suffering as harshly from either economic or 
policy disconnect as BIP or CS-SIP respectively – 
possibly due to the more accommodating stance towards 
the local partners – VSIP is not completely free from 
them, either. 
In India, ITPL has arguably experienced success in 
capitalizing on first-mover advantages in a regional 
economy with immense market potential. More subtly, its 
apparent success has leveraged various Singapore 
companies’ foray into the Indian IT industry. The 
apparent success of ITPL should not be overestimated, 
however; while the specialized IT focus of the park 
precludes, to a certain extent, anxieties about rising labor 
costs and high overhead costs, limited support from the 
local government, as well as the other inherent 
organizational constraints of the Singapore-styled system, 
continue to bedevil the development of the park. The 
project’s continued success is, at the current time, at risk 
from an environment of disparities in local-state support 
for competing developments; many of which will 
eventually, in all probability, be creating economic 
competition for ITPL, in the midst of an ambivalent 
policy environment. 
In summary, the Singapore government’s role in 
developing, managing and operating the overseas 
industrial parks has been crucial from the start. However, 
initial assumptions of the advantages engendered by the 
state enterprise networks, as successfully proven through 
its GLC network domestically, have proven to be overly 
optimistic. The unforeseen and combined tensions of 
differing agendas, sometimes within the same host 
government, intertwined with the cultural and political 
complexities of large economies, and the uncontrolled 
external environment, serve to diminish the efficiency and 
commercial viability of the parks; and, indeed, the 
inherent costs of the parks themselves were severely 
underestimated. In hindsight, the ambition and optimism 
of developing an ‘exportable version’ of GLC networks, 
together with strategic alliances with regional 
governments, have been quite misplaced; the same 
product, after all, takes on very different qualities, and 
evokes very different reactions, in different environments, 
and therefore is far from independent of the complexities 
of the market it is being sold to. The limits to the weaving 
of state-enterprise networks beyond demarcated national 
boundaries have, arguably, been made all too obvious in 
the R21 projects. 
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